From elastic!lethe!abyss!news2.compulink.com!news3.idirect.com!n2tor.istar!tor.istar!east.istar!ott.istar!istar.net!van.istar!west.istar!n1van.istar!van-bc!uniserve!oronet!news.sprintlink.net!news-stk-11.sprintlink.net!nntp.primenet.com!newsfeeder.sdsu.edu!news.sgi.com!news.msfc.nasa.gov!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in2.uu.net!psinntp!psinntp!psinntp!ncrgw2.ncr.com!ncrhub6!daynews!ranger!military Thu Aug 1 18:56:44 1996 Xref: elastic sci.military.moderated:3776 Newsgroups: sci.military.moderated Path: elastic!lethe!abyss!news2.compulink.com!news3.idirect.com!n2tor.istar!tor.istar!east.istar!ott.istar!istar.net!van.istar!west.istar!n1van.istar!van-bc!uniserve!oronet!news.sprintlink.net!news-stk-11.sprintlink.net!nntp.primenet.com!newsfeeder.sdsu.edu!news.sgi.com!news.msfc.nasa.gov!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in2.uu.net!psinntp!psinntp!psinntp!ncrgw2.ncr.com!ncrhub6!daynews!ranger!military From: johnj@wchat.on.ca (Andrew Jaremkow) Subject: Re: SAM taking out a jumbo jet, how hard? Message-ID: Sender: military@ranger.daytonoh.ncr.com (Sci.military Login) Organization: Bell Global Solutions References: Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 16:34:40 GMT Approved: military@ranger.daytonoh.ncr.com Lines: 124 From johnj@wchat.on.ca (Andrew Jaremkow) Morgoth wrote: >From Morgoth >I know it has been the fear of many anti-terr groups, that a terr group >will acquire a SAM (shoulder or otherwise) and sit of a busy airport and >take potshots at jumbo jets. >How difficult would this be, and why? There are two parts to this. The first, and by far the most difficult, is the acquisition of the weapon in question. You have two options: a) obtain it from a legitimate government with their blessing, or b) steal it, or pay someone to steal it for you. The former leads to deniability problems for the government in question. Man portable SAMs aren't made everywhere, and tracing them is a lot easier than tracing a bit of plastique or dynamite. Furthermore they're expensive, and so dramatic that any use of the weapon will bring quite a bit more condemnation than a simple bombing. I suspect terrorist sponsoring nations would be reluctant to give this sort of support unless they could hide their involvment very deeply. Stealing the weapon (ie.obtaining it illicitly) has gotten much easier in the last five to ten years. SAMs are in the hands of several guerilla groups (notably the Afghans) who have reportedly sold some for hard currency. It is very difficult to track the numbers of weapons and their whereabouts in an irregular organization. The chaos in Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union, pullout of troops (both NATO and Warpac), reunification of Germany, re-equipping of Warpac nations, and flaring civil wars have all provided ample opportunity for one or two of the weapons to take a walk for cash. When we hear of Soviet nuclear material being stored in padlocked sheds can their other security measures be viewed with confidence? Furthermore, as weapons are upgraded from generation to generation (SA-7 to SA-14, etc) the opportunity exists to set aside an obsolete weapon or two and claim they have been destroyed. What sort of weapon is the terrorist likely to get? The tremendous cost and technical sophistication of the larger systems coupled with their size almost certainly rules them out. (But not entirely... Who would have thought a terrorist cult would have attempted to develop chemical, biological, and radiological weaponry, and then mounted a complex nerve gas attack on a major subway system?) I would suspect the terrorist would pass on anything radar guided, with the requirements for search radars, guidance radars, control centres, and power sources. This means weapons like the SA-8, Roland, Crotale, Rapier, and anything larger are out. The man portable SAMs would be the weapon of choice. Small, light, easy to use and conceal, and without any support requirements these weapons are almost purpose built for the terrorist. The various SA-7s, both Soviet models and various clones, would be the most readily available. Later models (SA-14, 16, and 18) would be progressively harder to come by. Redeyes are almost certainly extinct by now, but there may still be some early Stingers floating around in Afghanistan, and an unscrupulous serviceman could provide a few new ones direct from Uncle Sam. The various optically quided weapons from Britain (Blowpipe, Javelin, Starburst) would be rather unlikely, having higher operator training requirements, and being far less widely deployed. The problem with the small IR SAMs is their lack of killing power. They have tiny warheads, and will usually track on an engine, meaning a large multi engined jetliner is likely to escape destruction, allbeit with serious wounds. A larger weapon, such as the Mistral, or a SA-9/13, or perhaps even Chaparral would be more likely to do sufficient damage to the airliner, but, again, obtaining and employing the larger weapons is problematic. Also remember, that with any of the weapons the terrorist must somehow obtain training if he is to use the weapon with any degree of success. This may be as difficult as obtaining the weapon itself, especially if it is a foreign make. Once the terrorist has the weapon, he is faced with the second part of his "mission": successfully using it. The terrorist must first smuggle the weapon into the target country, and then to the launch site. Attacking Israel might be a little tough. It is a small, heavily guarded target. Getting something into America, on the other hand, is not too difficult. It has enormous relatively unguarded coastlines, and a vast undefended border with Canada. Bringing the weapon across somewhere in the Prarie provinvces would probably be the easiest. Getting the device into Canada would be so laughably simple it's not funny. A boat could land almost anywhere on our completely unguarded coastline without any difficulty. Once the weapon has evaded border inspection it can be toted about in the trunk of any car you please. Assuming the terrorist has safely reached the airport, where should he set up? The jets would be most vulnerable at takeoff, when they are low, slow, and fully loaded. With the marginal performance of the weapon attacking the plane on takeoff is almost a necessity. Simply parking your car at the end of the runway and leting loose is almost certain to get you caught though. I'd back off a kilometer or so, and try to find a rooftop position, preferably in an industrial area where there are fewer observers. If the airport is out in the country concealmant and escape is a lot easier. I would also try to attack shortly after dawn on a grey cloudy morning. The low contrast sky would hide the smoke trail much better than a blue sky, the missile flare would be much less obvious than at night, and there would be fewer observers around. Furthermore, the weapon operator would be able to clearly see the target. In order to kill the target it would probably be necessary to fire several rounds. This makes it more likely that someone will see or hear the terrorist, so I think it's unlikely that the shooter would stick around and down several jets. Also, performing multiple engagements requires multiple ammunition loads, which is a significant logistics problem. Acquiring one or two missiles is difficult enough, but getting five or six or more and hiding them is a much more difficult proposition. I would be far more worried about a group salvoing off two or three missiles at a single airliner and fading into the city than about a sustained operation against a succession of planes. >I have some ideas. but.. ...but you don't want to give them away??? Andrew Jaremkow johnj@wchat.on.ca